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A bstract
A generalization of processing problems with restricted capacities 
is introduced. In a processing problem there is a finite set of jobs, 
each requiring a specific amount of effort to  be completed, whose costs 
depend linearly on their completion times. The new aspect is that 
players have interest in all jobs. The corresponding cooperative game 
of this generalization is proved to be totally balanced.
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1 Introduction
In a processing problem there is a finite set of jobs, each requiring a spe­
cific amount of effort to be completed, whose costs depend linearly on their 
completion times. There are no restrictions whatsoever on the processing 
schedule. The main feature of the model is a capacity restriction, i.e., there 
is a maximum amount of effort per time unit available for handling jobs.
In Meertens, Borm, Quant, and Reijnierse (2004) processing problems 
are studied in a cooperative game theory framework. They consider a model 
in which a player, endowed with an individual capacity for handling jobs, is 
assigned to exactly one job (i.e. there is a one-one correspondence between 
the jobs and the players). Each coalition of cooperating players in fact faces
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a processing problem with the coalitional capacity being the sum of the 
individual capacities of the members. The corresponding processing game 
summarizes the minimal joint costs for every coalition. They prove that 
these processing games are totally balanced by providing an explicit core 
element.
In this paper, we study a generalization of the model. This generalization 
considers processing situations with shared interest. In a processing situation 
with shared interest each player, still endowed with a personal capacity, may 
have interest for each job tha t has to be completed and the number of jobs 
need not to be equal to the number of players. More particularly, the cost- 
coefficients do not only depend on the jobs, but also on the players. Each 
player can have an interest for every job to be completed, this interest may 
be different for each player. This situation incorporates the previous model; 
a standard processing situation can be described by a processing situation 
with shared interest in which each player has exactly one strictly positive 
cost coefficient and so does each job. The related processing games with 
shared interest are proved to be totally balanced.
2 P rocessing gam es
A processing problem P  with restricted capacity consists of a tuple
(J,p =  (pj )j€j , a  =  (aj )j€j  ,/3).
Here, J  is a finite set of jobs tha t need to be completed. The vector p e  R+ 
contains the processing demands or efforts of the jobs, furthermore a  e  R+ 
is the vector of cost coefficients and 3  is a strictly positive real number 
denoting the maximum available effort per time unit, or shortly capacity. 
The costs for job j  e  J  to be uncompleted for a period of time t equals 
aj ■ t. The objective is to find a feasible schedule such tha t the total costs 
are minimized. This minimum is denoted by c(P). To attain  these minimal 
costs, the jobs should be completed one after an other. It is proved that 
to complete all jobs such that total costs are minimized, it is optimal to 
complete the jobs one by one. The order in which this is done depends on 
the urgency of the jobs. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition  2.1 (cf. Sm ith  (1956)). Let P  be a processing problem such
tha t J  =  { 1 ,. . . ,  \J i) and the jobs are numbered such that — > ■ ■ ■ > .j pi — — pji
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Then it is optimal to process the jobs in increasing order and
\J I
c(v ) =  i Y l ai • [Pl +  ••• +  Pi]•
i=l
In a processing situation (N ,J ,p  =  (pj ) jeJ , a  =  (a j ) je J , (0i)ieN ) there 
is a finite set of players N , in which each player i e  N  is endowed with a 
strictly positive capacity of /3i , in order to perform jobs. Each job j  e  J  has 
a processing demand pj and cost coefficient a j , both in R+. As long as job j  
is uncompleted, it generates a cost of size aj  per time unit. Each player has 
to complete one specific job in J . Since each player has only one job and 
players have not the same job, there is a one-one correspondence between 
players and jobs and no confusion occurs when the processing demand and 
the cost coefficient of the job of player i are denoted by pi and ai respectively.
Let S  C N  be a coalition of players who decide to cooperate. This 
coalition has the disposal of the individual capacities of all of its members, 
i.e. coalition S  can maximally generate an amount of effort of size f3(S) := 
0i per time unit. The aim of coalition S  is to complete all jobs of its 
members, such tha t aggregate costs are minimized. This situation gives rise 
to the processing problem
P (S) := {J(S ), (pi)ies , (ai)ies , 0 (S)),
in which J (S ) denotes the set of jobs of players in S . The processing game 
{N, cP) in which cP : 2N — > R+ is the map defined by
cP (S) := c(P(S )) for all S C N •
Theorem  2.1 (cf. M eertens et al. (2004)). Processing games are 
totally balanced.
Let {N ,J ,p  =  (pj) jeJ , a  =  ( a j) je J , (0i)ieN) be a processing situation. 
In fact the authors show tha t the vector y e  RN with
i n
yi =  wN) p k + Ti -  wN) Tk, (1)
k=l k=l
for all i e  N , is a core allocation of the corresponding processing game, 
provided tha t N  := {1, • • • ,n}  and Or > • • • > an • Here Ti denotes the taxL J p1 Pn
paid by player i , and this tax is defined by:
n
Ti :=  ~PpN) • [2 •ai +  ^  a ^  • 
k=i+l
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So, the amount player i e  N  has to pay in the core allocation y consists of 
three parts. The first part k=l pk gives the actual costs of player i.
These are the product of the cost coefficient of player i and the completion 
time of his job. The second part Ti is the tax paid by player i , which is 
paid because all players work on the job of player i and all jobs with lower 
urgencies have to wait for completion. The sum of taxes is redivided among 
the players proportionally to their capacities. This results in the third part 
— '@NjYin=l Tk, called the subsidy to player i. It is done in order to reward 
players with large capacity. A more detailed explanation of this core element 
can be found in Meertens et al. (2004).
3 P rocessing gam es w ith  shared interest
In this section we analyze an extension of processing situations and the 
corresponding processing games. In stead of each player having one job, we 
allow them to have interest in several jobs. We prove tha t the corresponding 
games are totally balanced.
A processing situation with shared interest P  can be described by a tuple 
{N ,J ,p  =  (p ) jeJ ,A ,0  =  (0i)ieN ). Here, N  is a finite set of players and J  
a finite set of jobs. The vector p e  R+ contains the processing demands 
of the jobs. 0  contains the capacities with which the players are endowed. 
The matrix A e  RN x R+ contains the cost coefficients of all players for all 
possible jobs. The number A j  denotes the cost coefficient of player i e  N  
with respect to job j  e  J . If Aij =  0 then player i has no interest in 
job j . Contrary to the original setting it is now possible for a player to 
have interest in several jobs and a job can be of interest for more than one 
player. The original problem can be modeled as a processing situation with 
shared interest by choosing the matrix A  to be a squared diagonal matrix. 
Let i e  N . The set of jobs in which player i is interested is denoted by 
Ji =  {j  e  J  | Aij > 0}.
If a coalition S  C N  decides to cooperate, its members have a total 
capacity of 0 (S ) := ^ ^ s  0i available in order to construct a schedule which 
completes all their jobs, such that total weighted costs are minimized. This 
situation gives rise to the processing problem
P (S) := {J(S), (pj)3ej (s ) , (A j(S )')jej(s), 0 (S)),
in which J (S) denotes Uie sJi , the set of all jobs which are of interest for 
players of S  and Aj (S ) =  ^ ^ s  A j  is the total cost coefficient of coalition
S  for job j . Analogous to the problem in which each player has only one
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job, one can associate a processing game with shared interest (N, cP) with 
cP : 2N — > R+ as follows:
cP (S) := c(P (S)) for all S  Q N.
Exam ple 3.1. Suppose there are two students who share an apartment. 
Since they just moved in, they need to buy some domestic appliances as a 
refrigerator, a stove and a washing machine. Each student has a restricted 
budget per month which is reserved for these purchases. Suppose student 1 
has a budget of 100 euro a month and the budget of student 2 equals 200 
euro a month. The costs of buying a new refrigerator, stove or washing ma­
chine are 300, 150 and 600 euro respectively. Both students have different 
priorities with respect to the three goods. For example student 1 can use 
the washing machine of a friend, so he is more in need of a refrigerator than 
a washing machine, on the other hand student 2 does not like cooking so he 
values a stove low. This situation can be modeled as a processing situation 
with shared interest, with player set N  =  {1, 2}, capacities 0  =  (100, 200) 
and processing demands (300,150,600). The matrix of cost coefficients rep­
resents the priorities of the students with respect to the goods and reflects 
the dissatisfaction of a student per month if he cannot make use of a certain 
machine. Suppose the cost coefficient matrix equals
The first column denotes the priority of the players with respect to the 
refrigerator, the second and third column denote the priorities with respect 
to the stove and the washing machine. If player 1 only has his own budget, 
then he first buys a stove, then a refrigerator and finally a washing machine,
together, they first buy a refrigerator, then a stove and finally a washing
Theorem  3.1. A processing game with shared interest is balanced.
To prove Theorem 3.1, we first prove balancedness for processing situa­
tions with multiple jobs. In a processing situation with multiple jobs players 
can have interest in more than one job, but each job is still of interest for 
only one player. In fact each player ”owns” a set of jobs.
A
since -r^ > • The total measure of ’’dissatisfaction” for studentbhhæ 15Q ^ 300 ^  goo- uuurn cœ ic ui iui m uciu,
1 equals cP ({1}) =  41 • 3 +  11 • 2 +  102 • 1 =  27. Similarly cP({2}) =
11 • 4 +  51 • 1 +  41 • 5 =  334 • If the students buy the domestic appliances
machine, and cP( N ) = 3 2 1 . o
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The next lemma states tha t a multiple jobs processing game is (totally) 
balanced. The proof uses a processing game in the original setting.
Lem m a 3.1. Every multiple jobs processing game is totally balanced.
Proof: Let (N ,cP) be a multiple jobs processing game with associated 
situation P  =  (N, J ,p ,A ,0 ) ,  i.e. Ji n  Jk =  0 for all i , k  £ N  with i =  k. 
Define the processing situation P  =  (J(N) ,J ,p ,a , j3 )  as follows. For each 
job in J  a player is created, so the player set of P  is J ( N ) and J ( N ) =  J . 
A ’player’ j , which is actually a job, keeps its processing demand pj and its 
cost coefficient becomes aj  =  A ij > 0, in which i is the unique player such 
tha t A j  > 0. The capacity 0i of a regular player i in N  is split equally over 
all new players originating from his job set Ji , resulting in:
Pj := J  for all i £ N, j  £ Ji .
It is left to the reader to verify tha t for each coalition S  C N  the following 
is true,
cP (S ) =  cP ( J  (S)). (2)
According to Theorem 2.1, the game (J (N ) ,cP) is totally balanced and 
has a core allocation y in R J(N), see equation (1). Define x  in RN by 
x i := J2jeJi yj for all i in N . Since equation (2) is valid and y £ C(cP ), it 
follows tha t x  £ C(cP). □
In order to prove tha t processing games with shared interest are balanced 
it is shown a core allocation exists. Before giving the proof an intuitive 
explanation of this core element is given. It is based on the allocation for 
processing games, see expression (1). Note tha t the tax Ti depends only on 
the processing time and the cost coefficient of the job of player i , say job j . 
Hence it can be considered to be a property of job j  and be called Tj. In this 
view one can easily extend this allocation to an allocation for a processing 
game with shared interest. Let P  =  (N, J,p, A, 0) be a processing situation 
with shared interest. Then the allocation x  with for all i N
^  A N ) ^  pk) +  Aj N )Tj) f/(N) ^  Tj ■ (3) 
jeJ k=i jeJ jeJ
is in the core of the game (N ,cP), provided tha t J  =  { 1 ,. . . ,  \ J |} and 
Al(N^ > . . .  > AlpJN  ^ (this means tha t if the grand coalition cooperates,
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the jobs are performed in the order ( 1 , . . . ,  \ J \)). The value Tj, is for every 
j  £ J  defined by
\J I
Tj =  j  [ 1 A j (N )+  £  A k (N)].
k=j+i
The division of the allocation into three parts is still accurate. The first part 
concerns the actual costs of the jobs. Each player i has to pay his personal 
actual costs of each job j . The second part gives the taxes of the jobs. 
These are imposed in proportion with the costs coefficients. The third part 
concerns the subsidies, which are still allocated proportionally with respect 
to the capacities of the players.
The core element x  is independent on the optimal order chosen:
Lem m a 3.2. Let (N, J,p, A, 0) be a processing situation with shared inter­
est. The core allocation x  as given by (3) does not depend on the choice of 
which optimal order is used to process the jobs.
Proof: Equation (3) can be rewritten as
xi :=  £  a^ N )  (Am ~  £  Pk +  Tj ) -  m  £  Tj . (4)
jeJ k=i jeJ
The result now follows from Meertens et al. (2004), since they prove that 
if another optimal order is used, the total amount of taxes paid does not 
change, and neither does the term j N )  Y k=1 Pk +  Tj for each j  £ J . □
We now turn  to the proof of Theorem 3.1.
P roof o f T heorem  3.1: Let P  =  (N ,J ,p ,A ,  0) be a processing situ­
ation with shared interest. W ithout loss of generality we assume that
J  =  { 1 ,. . . ,  \ J \} and Ai<yN' > . . .  > A J^ |(N' . Let x  be the allocation aspi — — pji
described in equation (3). We first show tha t it is sufficient to prove tha t x  
is a core allocation in the case \N\ =  2. To prove tha t x  is a core allocation 
if \N\ =  2 an induction argument on the number of jobs for which both 
players have a positive cost coefficient is used.
Suppose tha t P  =  (N ,J ,p ,A ,  0) is a situation such tha t x  £ C(cP ). Then 
there exists a coalition S  C N  such that x ( S ) =  ^ ieS x i > cP(S ). Define 
a two person processing situation P  with shared interest as follows: (N  =  
{1,2} ,J ,p ,A ,  ¡3). The job set and the vector of processing demands remain 
unchanged. Player 1 can be seen as the player representing coalition S
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and player 2 as the player representing coalition N \ S .  The matrix of cost 
coefficients A  is defined as follows: A j  =  Aj  (S) and A 2j =  Aj  (N \ S ) for 
all j  G J . The vector of capacities ¡3 is given by ¡3 =  (3(S), /3 (N \S )). Note 
tha t the coalitions N  and N  perform exactly the same jobs and for each 
job j  G J , Aj ( N ) =  Aj ( N ), hence the optimal orders for both problems 
coincide. The same is true for the coalitions S  and {1}, and N \ S  and {2}. 
Hence
cP(N ) = cp (N ), cP(S) =  cp ({1}), cP (N \S ) = cp ({2}).
Let x  be the allocation corresponding to P  (as described in (3)). Since 
Aij = Y  ies Aij and A 2j = Y i e N \ S A i j , it follows from equation (4) that
x(S) =  Xi, 
x ( N \ S )  =  X2.
This indicates tha t X is not a core allocation of the game (N , c P). Hence, 
if there is a situation in which x  is not a core allocation, then there is also 
such a situation with only two players.
Assume tha t \N\ = 2 .  Let £(P) be the number of jobs for which both 
players have a strictly positive cost coefficient (i.e. £(P) := {j  G J  \ A j  >
0 and A2j > 0}). We prove our statement by induction.
If £(P) =  0 we deal with a processing problem with multiple jobs. In this 
case, x  coincides with the allocation x  that is shown to be in the core of the 
corresponding processing game with multiple jobs in the proof of Lemma 
3.1.
Let k G N. Assume tha t for each two person processing game with 
shared interest for which £(P) does not exceed k, x  is a core element. Let 
P  =  (N  =  {1,2}, J ,p ,A ,  ¡3) be a processing situation such that £(P) equals 
k +  1. We prove that x G C(cP), which completes the induction argument. 
Let j  be a job with shared interest. W ithout loss of generality we assume that 
the processing demand of job j  equals the total cost coefficient: pj =  Aj ( N ) 
(this is just a m atter of scaling). Then the urgency of job j  equals 1. Define 
another processing situation P  =  (N, J  ,p, A, 3). P  arises from P  by splitting 
j  into two jobs with single interest, both having urgency 1, like j .  This yields
J  =  {1 , - - - , j  -  1 , ja, j b, j  +  1 ,. . . , \J \L 
p =  { p i , . . . , P j - i , A i j  ,A2j ,p j+ i , . . . ,p | j  |},
A  =  i  Aii . . .  Ai(j-i) Aij 0 Ai(j+i) . . .  Ai|JI ^ .
V A2i . . .  A2(j-i) 0 A2j A2(j+i) . . .  A2| J I )
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Let x  be the allocation defined by equation (3) tha t corresponds to P . By 
the induction hypothesis it holds tha t x £ C (cP ). Hence cP({i}) — x i > 0 for
i £ {1,2}. Note that it is sufficient to prove that cP({i}) — x i > cP({i}) — x i , 
since this guarantees that x  is a core element. It is equivalent to show that
cP ({i}) — cP({i}) > xi — xi. (5)
In order to prove inequality (5), we prove two statements:
cP ({i}) — cP ({i}) > (6)
x i —x i = W N t  (7)
for i £ {1, 2}. Inequality (5) immediately follows from inequality (6) and 
equality (7) and the fact tha t 0i < 0 ( N ).
Let i =  1, note tha t the job set of player 1 in the new situation can be 
written as J 1 =  ( J 1\ { j }) U { ja}. Let a be the optimal order of player 1 for 
the processing problem P ({1}) and let a be the same order as a, but job j  
is replaced by j a. This means tha t player 1 completes the jobs in the old 
order a, but in stead of job j , job j a is performed. Order a is a possible 
order to solve the processing problem P ({1}). We compare the costs of a 
with the costs of a . Since the processing demands of jobs j  and ja are not 
equal (contrary to the cost coefficients!), this yields a cost reduction of at 
least
j i  (pj — pja) ' Aij =  h  (Aj (N) — Ai j )Aij =  Aj r 1 .
Note that the ready times of jobs beyond j  become smaller in a . This yields 
an extra cost reduction. Hence the value found above is a lower bound for 
the cost reduction. It is possible tha t for player 1 another order becomes 
optimal when facing P ({1}). This leads to the following estimation:
cP({1}) < c(a) < cP({1}) — j - ,
where c(a) denotes the costs if player {1} performs his job in the order a. 
The same argument holds for player 2, which proves inequality (6).
Jobs j a and j b have equal urgency for coalition N . Since x  does not 
change if jobs with the same urgency are switched (Lemma 3.2), we assume 
tha t the order corresponding to x  equals (1, . . .  , j  — 1, ja, j b, j  + 1 , . . . ,  \ J \). 
Let T be the vector of taxes corresponding with x. Denote ^ k>j A k ( N ) by 
s. It is easy to verify the following equations:
Tk =  Tk for all k £ J \ { ja , j b },
T ja =  I N  ( i  Aja (N ) +  Ajb ( N ) +  S),
T jb =  i N (2 Ajb(N) + s ) .
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Because A 1j =  Aja ( N ), A2j =  Ajb ( N ) and pj =  A j  +  A2j , we have
1
Tja +  Tjb =  @(N) V 2( (A1j +  A2j)2 +  (A1j +  A2j)s) =  J(N) (2pj +  s) =  Tj •
This implies that the total amount of taxes paid, does not change: ^  -j  Tj =  
Y j e J  Tj • Since p ja +  p jb =  p j , the completion times of all other jobs remain 
unchanged. We can now calculate the difference between the two allocations:
x 1 — x 1
And
A1 j 
P(N)
A
ja
ij
Aj (N) Tj /3(N)
k=1
A1j A1j
J(N)pj — J(N)p j
p k
k=1
4^ja (N) lja
A1j
Aj (N) Tj — Tja
+  J(N) ( 1 Aj (N) +  s) — ( 2 Aja (N) +  A jb (N) +  s)0(N)
Aij Afj 
P(N) 
Aij A2j
2f3(N) •
+ AijWn )
f 3 ( N j
2 (A1j +  A2j) — JNrj ( 2 A1j +  A2j)
x 2 — x 2 = Af j0(N)
A A
jb
Aj (N)Tj 0(N)j
k=1
p k
k=1
Aj
Aj (N) j  
A2j
— T-
Tj
jb
Aj (N) 
Aj (N)Aj (N) j
—Aij _
Av (N) Tj +  Tja
A
(Tj — T ja )
A'
j -  T­ j4^jb (N) jb
TT(1 Aj (N) +  s) +  TTNT(1 Aja(N) +  Ajb(N) +  s)¡3(N) V2 j^  
—Aij 1 
0(N)
A1jA2j 
2f3(N) •
^( ) V2^  j  
2 (A1j +  A2j) +  Wn ) (2 A1j +  A2j)
This proves equation (7) and the theorem. □
A1ja a
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